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Abstract 
 
This article shows that the main pattern of European democratization has unfolded along the lines 
of an EU organized as a multilevel system of representative parliamentary government and not as 
a system of deliberative governance as the transnationalists propound. But the multilevel EU has 
developed a structure of representation that is theoretically challenging. In order to come to grips 
with this we present an institutional variant of deliberative theory, which understands democracy 
as the combination of a principle of justification and an organizational form. It comes with the 
following explanatory mechanisms: claimsmaking, justification and learning which in the EU 
also program institutional copying and emulation mechanisms. We show that the EU has 
established an incomplete system of representative democracy steeped in a distinct 
representation-deliberation interface, which has emerged through a particular and distinct 
configuration of democratization mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper to be presented at the 12
th
 EUSA Biennial International Conference, Boston, MA, March 3-
5, 2011 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
The European Union is a deeply contested political entity, also in democratic terms. It has a 
democratic vocation, but the EU is not a state, and the democratization process has not unfolded 
along the lines of nation-state-based democracy. The Union then also lacks important democratic 
enabling conditions, such as a nation, a pre-political people, and a collective European identity 
based on a common language and culture. Analysts point to the absence of a European demos, 
but are puzzled by the high degree of compliance in the absence of the „kratos‟ of the 
„demoskratos‟. Transnationalists such as Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel and James Bohman 
claim that the European Union has democratic qualities which relate to its distinct polity traits.
1
 
As a polycentric system of networked governance the Union‟s democratic potential, in their view, 
emanates from its ability to deter domination, and to develop democratic forms that differ from 
state-based modes of representative democracy. The most suitable and promising form of 
democracy for such an innovative configuration is not representative government but rather 
direct-deliberative polyarchy
2
 or a transnational multiple-demoi mode of deliberative 
democracy.
3
 
Against this, numerous analysts including for instance Berthold Rittberger,
4
 Simon Hix et 
al.,
5
 Julie Smith,
6
 and Glyn Morgan
7
 have underlined that EU democratization has unfolded in a 
more state-like hierarchical fashion along representative-democratic lines, as manifested in the 
development of the EP and in the consolidation of representative democracy in the Member 
States.  
Our point of departure is that the main thrust of EU democratization has unfolded along 
representative-democratic lines but within a government-type organisation which falls well short 
3 
of sovereign statehood, but still includes stronger elements of stateness than a mere transnational 
governance arrangement.
 8
 In that sense we agree with Rittberger and Hix that the EU‟s 
representative-democratic thrust is readily apparent in its democratic self-conception; it is also 
that form of democracy that the EU has entrenched in its institutional-constitutional structure; 
and it is the democratic form that most critics evaluate the EU against. The European Parliament 
is directly elected by the EU‟s citizens (as the only supranational parliament in the world); it is a 
co-legislator with the Council in a wide range of issue-areas; and it is also able to hold the 
Commission accountable. This development has not produced a full-fledged EU system of 
representative democracy, but the EP‟s development nevertheless exhibits a clear trend towards a 
more explicit parliamentarianism at the EU-level. 
The EU‟s strong parliamentary thrust runs against the transnational governance position 
on EU democratization. But this development exhibits distinct traits that are not well enough 
picked up by those that underline the strong EU representative thrust.
9
 The EU has developed a 
distinct multilevel representative structure which falls short of but also clearly differs from the 
two-channel structure that is characteristic of federal systems (where one channel links the 
citizens to the federal level and the other to the state/province/Land level). The EU‟s 
representative structure is more akin to a multilevel parliamentary field,
10
 where the EP is tightly 
linked with the national parliaments through structured patterns of communication and 
interaction.
11
 These observations suggest that there is merit in the transnationalists‟ emphasis on 
deliberation but the process has taken a different institutional form than what they propound.  
Consequently, in this article we argue that the EU‟s democratization is best understood 
when considered from a deliberative approach, but through a special institutional version of 
deliberative theory that is geared to representative democratic institutional arrangements. The 
theory adds to existing accounts because it provides a better account of the distinct and 
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characteristic feature of EU integration, namely that it unfolds in a setting of already established 
representative democracies. Europeans derive their understanding of modern democracy from 
this institutional-constitutional setting; it has figured as a major institutional resource and impetus 
for the EU‟s democratization; and this understanding has implications for how we should 
conceptualize democratization.  
In this article we first outline this institutional version of deliberative democratic theory, 
which comes with the following explanatory mechanisms: claims-making, justification and 
learning which also deliberatively encode copying and emulation mechanisms. Throughout we 
briefly apply it to the EU to demonstrate its relevance for the distinct pattern of democratization 
that the EU has thus far undergone. In the concluding section we present some of the implications 
that a multilevel system of tightly interwoven parliaments brings up for the theory and practice of 
representative democracy. 
 
II. Democratization through deliberation 
Deliberative theory is premised on the force of reason-giving in collective decision-making 
processes. The actors coordinate their actions through giving and responding to reasons. How 
then to think of democracy and democratization from a deliberative perspective? 
In order to address this we start from the understanding of deliberative theory that also 
transnationalists embrace, namely that democracy is foremost a higher-order legitimation 
principle, which sets out the requisite conditions for justification. It is first and foremost a 
principle, or a critical standard, that sets down the conditions for how to get things right in the 
political sphere of action. In democracies, only public deliberation can get political results right, 
as it entails the act of justifying the laws to the people who are bound by them. On the most 
5 
fundamental level, deliberation and not voting, is the currency of democracy, as one needs to 
argue for the use of other decision-making procedures.
12
 Democratic systems contain provisions 
to ensure that prior to aggregative procedures, extensive processes of discussion and opinion 
formation can take place.
13
  
This in no way denies the importance of voting and other formal systems of representation 
and decision-making. Without formal-legal egalitarian procedures of law-making there is no 
democracy.
14
 Deliberation in itself cannot bear the entire burden of democratic legitimation 
because it is impossible to meet the requirement of having the legal norms accepted by all 
affected parties in a free and open debate. Only with law-making procedures and political 
institutions in place can citizens effectively influence the laws that affect them, and determine 
whether the reasons provided are good enough. The raison d‟être of democratic procedures is to 
produce good and fair results, but results do not justify themselves. They rest on prior political 
decisions and are themselves in need of justification. Under modern conditions, only procedures 
can lend legitimacy to results.
15
 The deliberative perspective thus comes with a set of legal-
institutional and procedural prerequisites. The most basic are: (a) a constitution with a set of 
inalienable rights; (b) fora for public debate; and (c) institutional mechanisms to transform 
political initiatives into collective commitments in a representative manner. 
This recognition has prompted us to develop an institutional variant of the deliberative 
perspective. As we will show, this perspective is particularly apposite to understand 
democratization in the EU which unfolds in a setting marked by a high density of democratic 
norms and principles – institutionally entrenched at the Member State level (and increasingly 
transferred to the EU-level).  
We accordingly understand democracy to combine a principle of justification with an 
organisational form for the handling of common affairs. Effective operation of the democratic 
6 
principle has to take an organisational form that will be capable of sustaining a set of properly 
delimited legislative, sanctioning and executive powers. This to a large extent makes up the very 
semantic of modern democracy, and is reflected in the global prevalence of representative 
(parliamentary) state-based democracy. The distinction between democracy as a principle of 
justification on the one hand, and as an organisational form on the other, helps to make sense of 
the democratic salience that modern societies attribute to parliamentarianism.  
The parliamentary organisational form is a real-life approximation to the democratic 
principle; thus the parliamentary principle is tied in with the principle of justification. The greater 
the normative thrust of the parliamentary principle, then, the easier it is for people to take it for 
granted that there is a close association between democracy and parliamentary democracy (as a 
specific institutional version of democracy). Representative (parliamentary) democracy has come 
to figure at the heart of modern democracy; this is certainly the case in the EU where every 
Member State is a constitutional representative democracy. Only democratic states will qualify 
for EU membership. 
Deliberative democracy in our reading, then, entails offering justifications to citizens, in 
light of agreed-upon standards.
16
 We have already identified the parliamentary principle as one 
such; it in turn forms part of a broader set of institutional-constitutional arrangements. What is 
the normative thrust of such arrangements? 
 
The thrust of parliamentary democracy  
Legal arrangements and democratic procedures establish choice opportunities, meeting places 
and behavioural constraints, but also the basic language codes or symbolic categories necessary 
for actors to sort out common affairs through rights and procedures. They constitute a common 
language – a medium – through which actors can reach agreement on collective commitments. 
7 
Democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, with their wider corollaries as the separation of 
powers, responsible government, and elections, are the discursive codes of political institutions 
that stem from the common constitutional traditions of the EU‟s Member States. They are deeply 
embedded in the pan-European, Western political culture. Such codes provide a common ground 
for actors to entrust each other. When properly entrenched in institutions and procedures, actors 
can be swayed by the force of the better argument or come to respect compromises and outcomes 
that are detrimental to their interests. 
Among the democratic procedures, parliament enjoys a special status, as it is frequently 
seen as the embodiment of democratic rule tout court. It embodies the idea of joint self-
determination in that an elected body of responsible citizens is there to legislate in the name of 
all. The parliamentary principle combines rules for inclusion of those affected with rules for 
deliberation and voting that aim at ensuring public debate, as well as reaching collectively 
binding decisions within a given time limit. Parliament is, according to Guizot, „the place in 
which particles of reason that are strewn unequally among human beings gather themselves and 
bring public power under their control‟.17 The parliamentary principle connects to the modern 
legitimation principle of government by discussion as it is founded on deliberative rational 
principles.
18
 It satisfies many of the conditions for critical justification of political power when 
properly institutionalized as a deliberative body – a strong public19 – with open channels to the 
public sphere rooted in civil society. It combines participatory and epistemic functions, and may 
thus be seen to warrant the presumption of rational and generally acceptable results. 
In modern polities, public deliberation is wed to systems of representation, as no system 
can accommodate the participation of all the relevant stakeholders. Representation refers to 
procedures and processes for citizens to influence political decision making and the actions of 
public officials in manners generally considered to be legitimate.  For large-scale societies, 
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representative democracy revolving on a deliberative assembly at its heart offers the possibility 
for „government by and of the people‟, insofar as it ties in with free opinion-forming processes in 
civil society. In a democracy the legitimating principle of political rule is the citizens‟ consent. 
The institutional nexus that is vital for forming, mediating, and executing citizens‟ will, at the 
same time faced with an increasingly complex political agenda, has a strong proclivity to liberate 
itself from democratic constraints and become independent. The parliament is a vital means for 
ensuring the proper mediation between the citizens and the political institutions. It serves the dual 
function of institutionalizing „the will of the people‟ and ensures that the policies enacted by the 
executive are grounded in this will. It is a system in which the process of deliberation is 
institutionalized and subjected to procedural constraints to such a degree that the citizens do not 
govern themselves directly. Rather, laws and collective decisions made by a representative body 
are subjected to the test of public reason – public inquiry and scrutiny – to the judgment and „the 
verdict of the people.‟20 Parliamentarianism does not exhaust the principle of democracy but 
operationalizes it and makes it fit for the real world or for non-ideal situations: 
parliamentarianism transforms democracy into feasible criteria of popular sovereignty and 
political equality. 
The rationale of parliament rests on a „dynamic-dialectic‟ of argument and counter-
argument, of public debate and discussion. Deliberation is intrinsic to the mode of representation 
that parliaments are based on, and enables government by discussion. John Stuart Mill noted that: 
„When it is necessary, or important to secure hearing and consideration to many conflicting 
opinions, a deliberative body is indispensable.‟21 The deliberative principle of representation can 
be stated as follows: „no proposal can acquire the force of public decision unless it has obtained 
the consent of the majority after having been subjected to trial by discussion.
22
 Hence, the 
modern conception of representation can be said to be parasitic on deliberation. No person can 
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consider herself to be legitimately represented unless the mandate and accountability terms are 
spelled out, and the represented are offered acceptable justifications for decisions taken on their 
behalf.  
How is the parliamentary principle reflected in the European democratisation process?  
 
The emergence of the European parliament 
Today, in the EU context, democracy and human rights are not only unavoidable as the means for 
interpreting the EU‟s recent history and as the means for defining what it is about – its identity; 
they also constitute the very language codes for dealing with common affairs, with roots back to 
the EU‟s very beginning. What is also notable is that the parliamentary principle, which 
comprises rules that regulate representation, the establishment and composition of political 
bodies, procedures, hearings, and decision-making, figured centrally from the EU‟s very 
inception. Representative democracy has found its strongest manifestation in today‟s European 
Parliament which developed from the body initially labelled the European Assembly, and which 
was set up in 1951. The parliamentary principle was proclaimed early on. This use of normative 
language helped to create an action-reinforcing process which over time gave institutional shape 
to the parliamentary principle in a non-state supranational setting: „In choosing to call itself a 
„parliament‟, the Assembly was not so much pretending to be a parliament as clearly pointing out 
that it wanted to become one. The same logic lay behind the name change from European 
Assembly to European Parliament in the Single European Act: the Member States were not so 
much declaring that the Assembly was a parliament as effectively recognising that it should 
become one.‟23 With the principle thus entrenched, the EP reinforced by supportive actors and 
institutional arrangements has pursued a lengthy and drawn-out struggle for recognition, which 
includes efforts to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council, and the 
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Member State governments. This process was one where central elements of the parliamentary 
organisational form were copied onto the European level. This struggle was justified with 
reference to the Union‟s dual legitimacy, a Union made up of citizens and of states.  
In Europe, the very term constitutionalisation has come to mean „the embedding of 
principles related to representative party-based democracy into the treaties;‟24 it entails „...the 
development of representative parliamentary institutions and the codification of fundamental 
rights‟.25  
The development of EU-level representative democracy took place through a gradual and 
stepwise process, which is still short of fruition. The EP was an important driver in this process, 
but it was also as we shall see given vital support from a range of institutions and procedures at 
the Member State and EU levels, as well as from societal actors. In the first decades this was still 
foremost an institution-driven process, with little direct public input. In fact, prior to the early 
1990s there had been little public discussion about the then EC‟s democratic credentials.26 
In many ways, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was the „triggering 
moment‟ when the corollaries of democracy, such as electoral control, separation of powers, and 
executive accountability (the discursive codes of political institutions that stem from the common 
constitutional traditions of the EU‟s Member States), became publicly flagged as the common 
categories of understanding and the joint evaluation standards that the actors should use when 
dealing with the EU. These were far from new with Maastricht but Maastricht amplified them 
through greatly increased public exposure. The Maastricht Treaty ratification process helped to 
shift the terms of discourse in that it made vital aspects of these common constitutional traditions 
of the Member States – notably fundamental rights and representative democracy - relevant for 
the EU as the proper operating procedures and as the appropriate criteria for normative 
evaluation. The Treaty of Maastricht and the response to the popular reaction underlined that the 
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EU embraced democratic norms, standards and language. Within this context, critics could no 
longer lambast the EU for a lack of democracy but instead had to talk of a European democratic 
deficit. The deficit was evocative of the gap that existed between on the one hand the aspirations 
that had been generated through the application of the democratic principle to the European level, 
and the EU‟s institutional-constitutional design and actual operational practice on the other. 
Since Maastricht, the EP has „managed to establish a link between a general public 
discourse about European democracy and a specific programme of institutional reform‟27. The 
EP‟s subsequent development has led Hix et al. to conclude that „In a rather short space of time, a 
matter of decades rather than centuries, the European Parliament has evolved from an unelected 
consultative body to one of the most powerful elected assemblies in the world.‟ 28 We see the 
EP‟s role on the one hand as somewhat less pronounced than what Hix et al. do (notably in the 
realm of EU foreign and security policy), and on the other hand we also see the EP as an intrinsic 
part of a - distinct - multilevel structure of representative government in the EU. 
How can we account for this development? To do so we must convert the institutional 
variant of deliberative theory into an analytical framework capable of explaining the dynamic 
process of EU democratization. 
 
III. Mechanisms of democratisation  
No single overarching theory – be it liberal intergovernmentalism with its rational choice 
assumptions
29
 or neo-functionalism with its premise on spill-over processes from „low‟ to „high 
politics‟30 - has thus far been able to explain how non-coercive integration - with a democratic 
imprint – has come about. Given this it is better to approach the problem at a less general level – 
from a middle-range theoretical perspective – and inquire into the institutions and procedures that 
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are conducive to democratization. This naturally leads us to focus on mechanisms that mediate 
between events and convert initiatives into practical results. Mechanism-explanation represents 
an alternative to the covering-law model of explanation which entails subsuming an event or a 
phenomenon under a general law and with reference to the conditions that make the law 
applicable in a specific case. In contrast mechanisms can explain why an event happened post-
factum. They do not predict. Mechanisms trigger actions under conditions of indeterminacy and 
do not determine outcomes.
31
  
A characteristic feature of the process of forging European-level democracy is that it takes 
place in a setting of already existing representative democracies. Another characteristic is that 
this is a gradual and step-wise process that has unfolded within a broader (EU) setting that lacks 
an explicit polity template. This in turn has given the democratization process its distinct shape 
(akin to a multilevel field). 
In this setting a strong impetus for European-level democratization has emanated from the 
mutual interaction and interweaving of the EU-level and the national level. As part of this 
national systems transfer democratic credos and institutional arrangements to the EU-level and 
the latter copy and emulate democratic credos and institutional arrangements and incorporate the 
role perceptions and frames that the national democratic patterns bring to and entrench in the 
European pattern of integration. We should therefore expect the process to activate such 
institutional mechanisms as framing, copying, and isomorphic pressure; the process may exhibit 
strong elements of path-dependency but also be susceptible to sudden external shocks. Such 
mechanisms and factors that initiate and condition change are found in neo-institutional theory 
which emphasises the endogenous nature of political institutions.
32
 
Neo-institutional theory is however not set up to accommodate justification. It is based on 
a contextual rationality, where „the rationality of the action is measured according to how well it 
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fits norms..‟33 This approach is limited in several respects. First, there is no means or device for 
rank-ordering norms in order of importance. The contextual logic posits that democratic norms 
can be transposed to the European level insofar as the latter makes up a norm-context that is 
congruent with that of the democratic Member States. But that is precisely the question in the 
EU: a key challenge for the EU has been to come up with convincing justifications for which 
democratic norms that are applicable to this unique setting. The very notion of a post-national, 
European democracy is contested. It was precisely in response to this question that the 
transnational governance approach to EU democracy was devised. To account for EU 
democratization we therefore need a set of mechanisms that are attuned to the logic of 
justification based on normative rationality; to cross-cutting, inter-contextual deliberation. 
Second, to avoid black-box and deterministic explanations, and to sustain the link 
between justification and organisational principle we need to see institutional mechanisms as 
embedded in social processes of sense-making and explanation. In order to understand when and 
how such mechanisms as copying or emulation operate we need to see them as socially defined 
action coordination mechanisms. For them to function as action drivers they need to be 
interpreted, communicated, recognized and converted into action schemes by agents‟ collective 
efforts. Deliberative theory explains by referring to the substantial reasons the actors actually 
give and their uptake, which depends on whether the reasons are good enough to motivate others 
to approve of them.
34
 It comes with the following explanatory mechanisms: claims-making, 
justification and learning. These work in sequences. They operate through the compelling force 
of the better argument, that is, through the publicness, the normative power and the 
reasonableness of reasons that the actors consciously act upon.  When claims-making triggers 
justification and learning, there is a case for deliberative theory. Normative learning is about how 
to make successful justification effective. When actors have learnt and reached an agreement 
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justified claims are adopted. In cases where conflicts of interests prevail, and no agreement is in 
sight because of the entrenched power constellations, normative learning entails agreement on 
which procedures to choose for conflict resolution. Normative learning entails agreeing on 
justified principles for how to deal with claims-making in problematic situations. Deliberation 
terminates in procedurally regulated bargaining and/or in voting when actors realize that there is 
profound disagreement and exit is not an option.
35
 
This approach suggests that when there is agreement on basic norms such mechanisms as 
copying and isomorphism may work. The more compelling the agreement, the greater the 
congruence, and the greater the overall thrust of these mechanisms. But when there is conflict and 
contention over norms and institutional arrangements, deliberative theory posits that mechanisms 
such as claims-making, justification and learning will come into play.  
 These observations bring up a number of considerations with implications for how we 
should analyse EU democratization from a deliberative perspective because the development and 
entrenchment of democratic arrangements in the EU occurs through contestation and 
politicization as well as through a process of overt or even tacit acceptance of democratic 
arrangements.
36
  
In the following we seek to identify these mechanisms and how they have shaped EU 
democratization. The actors‟ sheer familiarity with and acceptance of representative democracy 
condition their justificatory demands. Europe‟s density of democratic norms and arrangements 
(historically at the Member State level but increasingly also at the European level) helps to ensure 
that such demands are carried by many institutional arrangements, which give impetus to the 
democratizing mechanisms and facilitate copying and emulation. These processes are given 
added impetus in particular triggering moments, events or episodes when actors are demanding 
reforms. In the EU this has to a considerable extent been made to operate in a recursive manner 
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where actors propound norms, institutions help to ensure that common understandings are being 
fostered; they provide arenas where actors can put forth demands for justifications in an ongoing 
manner; procedures ensure that such justifications are forthcoming and learning is 
institutionalised; and veto points that activate publics (such as popular referenda) offer a set of 
additional safeguards for justification. Our assumption, then, is that this sequence has not only 
come into play in the EU but it has taken a distinct shape: There is basic agreement on democracy 
and the need to entrench this in representative form but there is also profound disagreement over 
how and where to locate this democracy. Post-national democracy is contested. This has 
prevented the sequence from coming full circle and has helped produce the distinct mode of 
representative-deliberative democracy that marks the EU‟s current multilevel configuration. 
To illustrate the particular configuration of democratizing mechanisms in the EU, we start 
with the main claims-makers. 
 
IV. Forging European Democratization  
In the EU a broad range of actors, including key personalities, core Member States, and EU 
institutions have made claims for EU representative democracy from the Communities‟ very 
inception. There were democratic federalists in the driving seat (in Member States and at the EU-
level), and federalists and integration proponents in general supported a close semantic link 
between democracy and the parliamentary principle. Jean Monnet, for instance, claimed early on 
that „In a world in which government authority is derived from representative parliamentary 
assemblies, Europe cannot be built without such an assembly‟37; Altiero Spinnelli wrote the 
Ventotene Manifesto for a federal Europe in 1942 and was instrumental in bringing the EP 
about;
38
 Joschka Fischer in 2000 launched the constitutional debate in Berlin‟s Humboldt 
16 
Universität, and called for a transition from a Staatenverbund to a fully parliamentarised 
federation. Member States have also been important: At the time of the EU‟s founding, the 
German delegation to the Schuman Plan negotiations propounded the federal democratic state as 
its normative template, and has held on to it since. Most of the EU‟s institutions have at various 
times acted as central agents for democratization. From the early stages, as noted, the EP has 
propounded the dual legitimation of the Union (citizens and states), and the need for entrenching 
the EU on democratic principles. The ECJ early on embraced fundamental rights as a key 
principle of EU law and contributed to strengthen the role of the EP. This development was given 
further symbolic and substantive weight with the Maastricht Treaty‟s entrenching of European 
citizenship. These comments reveal that the mechanisms of copying and emulation have played 
an important role, and central carriers of these have been institutional actors.  
Copying and emulation are never automatic but operate in a broader structure of claims-
making and demands for justifications. Critics and integration sceptics of all forms and stripes 
have constantly underlined the need to ensure that the integration process must comply with 
democratic norms, and have underscored the need to protect democracy in the face of European 
integration. The critics have consistently held up parliamentary democracy as the appropriate 
standard to match EU-level democracy against.
39
 
 
Institutionalized deliberation and isomorphic pressure 
These claims have become– to different degrees – entrenched in legal-institutional arrangements 
and have amounted to significant institution-carried impetuses for further democratization, with 
clear knock-on effects on procedural arrangements, modes of popular consultation, transparency, 
and openness. Maastricht, as noted, shifted the terms of discourse so that from then on the 
democratic deficit label was affixed to the EU. But well before that the EU had established 
17 
various institutions and procedures to ensure institutionalised deliberation. In the Council, the 
Commission and the EP as well as in committees and policy-networks, representatives from 
Member-State governments and from citizens, with different backgrounds and on the basis of 
divergent political affiliations, have long been brought together in common forums to find a 
legitimate basis for problem-solving and conflict resolution. Because the EU‟s formal 
instruments of power are weak, ensuring agreement is an essential part of the nature of EU 
decision-making. This system is set up as, and functions as, a consent-based system, where 
unanimous voting procedures go together with more complex processes and procedures for 
deliberation and sounding out. Very substantial resources are expended to foster and ensure 
consensus and to work out disagreements over the different institutional-democratic visions that 
the participants bring into play. Non-agreement is difficult for such joint-decision systems, as it 
leads to loss of control and reduces the „...independent capabilities of action over their member 
governments.‟40 It leads to loss in efficiency, as well as in legitimacy. The requirement of 
consensus is apparent in the institutional structure, and in the relations among the institutions. For 
instance, „resort to explicit majority voting is often viewed as something of a political failure…‟ 
The undertakings and procedures employed prior to decision-making indicate that the EU 
practises a kind of extreme consensus democracy .
41
  
 The EU‟s practice and institutional make-up support the notion of a non-coercive, 
consensual decision-making system which lends itself well to step-wise processes of 
democratization through institutional and procedural tinkering. But it is also a system that is 
prone to democratically unauthorised integration through stealth and even non-decisions.
42
 
Necessary decisions are not made or they are very often „delayed‟.  
 The EP‟s development cannot be explained with reference to the EP alone, it is part of a 
much broader structure that conditions its development. This is well illustrated by the fact that the 
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EP‟s institutional role has been systematically increased in treaty amendment processes it has 
been formally excluded from. The EP‟s development has been greatly shaped by the fact that it 
forms an intrinsic part of a broader organisational field made up of parliamentary-representative 
governments based on a particular set of discursive codes, and legitimating principles, which 
relates back to the development of the EU within a context of already existing – mainly 
parliamentary - democracies. The multilevel EU thus contains a distinct European multilevel 
parliamentary field made up of the Member States‟ parliaments, the EP and the party systems. 
They operate as transmitters of organizational practices and structures among their participating 
organizations. Such a parliamentary organisational field can therefore be conceived of as a 
collection of organizations that constitutes a segment of actors, norms and roles, which is marked 
by connectedness and some element of structural equivalence.
43
 
 The field is sustained through patterns of interaction based on shared functions and role 
perceptions, namely representing people‟s interests in EU decision-making. What distinguishes it 
as a parliamentary field is the character and density of inter-parliamentary interaction; the 
character of the field‟s constitutive units (parliaments); and the manner in which these two 
dimensions interact to give overall shape to the field.  
Through the EP‟s development many of the national parliaments and their popular 
constituencies have exerted normative, coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures on the EU-
level, and notably on the EP, to comply with the principle of parliamentary democracy. 
Normative pressure relates to the fact that only parliaments have achieved the competence 
to speak for the people – they represent the code for the institutional embodiment of popular 
sovereignty. The EP has – given the inherent legitimacy of the parliamentary principle - been 
able to utilise its normative advantage  in a communicative manner to sway others to increase the 
EP‟s role and status. The EP has then over time also acquired more formal means of power. 
19 
Normative pressure has been complemented by additional increments of coercive and mimetic 
pressure. 
Coercive pressure relates for instance to the pressure exerted on the EP by national 
parliaments to comply with representative democratic norms. Such pressures have been exerted 
directly on the EP but also on the legal-institutional framework that defines the EP‟s role within 
the EU system. This latter pressure has been important because the EP‟s own means to enhance 
its power and status have been weak. Several national parliaments have for instance included the 
EP in Treaty-amendment processes through loaning it their vetoes.
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 In that sense national 
parliaments have explicitly albeit informally affirmed the constitutive role of the EP in the 
development of the EU‟s constitutional structure. The EP‟s gradually expanding powerbase has 
in turn rendered it more effective as a co-legislator with the Council and in controlling the 
election of Commissioners (the EP was for instance active in the dismissal of the Santer 
Commission in 1999).  
Mimetic isomorphic factors relate to the fact that it is „impossible‟ to come up with a 
viable alternative to the parliamentary model of democracy, as it is deeply embedded in 
institutional form, in social and cultural expectations, and in the organizational technologies of 
modern states. The EP was itself from its inception entrenched in a parliamentary network, as it 
was initially made up of national parliamentarians. From its very founding some national political 
parties and parliaments sought to apply the parliamentary standard to the assembly that became 
the EP. But until 1979 when direct elections were installed, the institution lacked the core 
legitimating component of any real parliament, namely direct popular representation. The 
isomorphic pressures exerted upon the EP from outside have since then become increasingly well 
reflected in the terminology – the copying of all the relevant parliamentary terminology; in the 
EP‟s composition, operating procedures and working methods; as well as increasingly so also in 
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its functions. These isomorphic pressures were sustained through participation in inter-
parliamentary networks (such as the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC) and 
assizes), and through the EP‟s own propounding of the need for the EU to embrace the 
parliamentary principle as the key to its democratic legitimacy.  
In order to account for the European democratization process it is therefore necessary to 
attend to the model power of the parliamentary template of representative democracy; normative 
and isomorphic, rather than merely, coercive, pressures. Communicative power created through 
public claims-making and justification triggered by criticism has „deliberatively encoded‟ these 
processes of copying and emulation.  
This form of communicative power also posits a dialectic relationship between public 
reaction and resentment in civil society and institutional response at the polity level. Wielding 
communicative pressure presupposes the existence of cherished and non-controversial principles, 
in this case the parliamentary principle. It reflects the learning that has taken place in Europe 
with regard to proper democratic rule, which helps explain why much of this process does not 
unfold as a struggle but as a less dramatic and less noticeable process of copying and emulation. 
 
Compelling justification 
Rittberger as noted above has observed that prior to the early 1990s there was little public 
discussion of the EU‟s democratic credentials.45 But the system has numerous built-in 
mechanisms for compelling reason-giving, justification and self-reflection. Critical scrutiny, 
judicial review, an ombudsman arrangement, transparency and openness clauses have been put in 
place. They ensure inclusion and hearing of different interests and their claims. Such constraints 
on decision-makers spur reflexivity and learning and their propensity to employ impartial reasons 
when responding to criticism. An important part of this, are popular referenda. They are 
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opportunities for citizens to exercise veto; they help to entrench the democratic principle as a 
relevant reference within the process of justification. Treaty changes require unanimity, and each 
state decides the procedure for how to ratify. At every instance of Treaty change, some states 
organize referenda (some are constitutionally required to do so). Nevertheless, where popular 
referenda are held, they so to say „take the public voice‟ and implicitly claim to speak for the 
entire European public. Because the general democratic code is shared, there are system-wide 
effects of individual referenda. Negative referendum results have been interpreted as testimony to 
the fact that the Union is democratically deficient; thus the long-term response to the referenda 
rejections has included further democratic reforms to prevent future referendum rejections. These 
reforms have again relied on the parliamentary principle, thus even direct democratic openings 
have given impetus to the EU‟s further parliamentarisation.  
 In this manner, representative parliamentary democracy has come to figure as the 
overarching norm that both proponents and opponents refer to, although they relate this to 
different conceptions of the EU (with Euro-sceptics still favouring nation-state representative 
democracy and Euro-federalists EU-level democracy). They disagree strongly on this 
organisational matter. In turn, what we find is a structure that stops short of full-fledged EU-level 
parliamentarisation and with national parliaments, individually and collectively, directly involved 
in EU-level decision-making. This structure builds on a unique configuration of representation 
and deliberation.  
 
V. Justifying representation in a changing world 
The particular configuration of mechanisms of claims-making, justification, and 
copying/emulation make it possible to account for the development of a system of representative 
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government at the EU-level, and in a non-state context. An important reason for this relates to the 
fact that the pattern of claims-making and justification has focused on those representative-
democratic arrangements that were already established in the Member States. There was never 
support for a full-fledged transfer of these to the EU-level. Changes in the realm of international 
law have made state sovereignty more conditional on compliance with the “sovereign citizen” (as 
a holder of human rights). Such global and regional-Europeanhuman rights clauses made 
representative democracy more readily acceptable at the European Union level because 
parliaments are representative bodies for citizens and can with courts be understood as essential 
protectors of citizens‟ rights. The broader international normative learning process that brought 
forth the notion of citizens‟ inalienable rights has therefore also given support to this institutional 
development, whose purpose it was to ensure that the polity contains a complement of 
institutions that offer mutually reinforcing sustenance of citizens‟ basic rights. 
These international changes have in turn also marked the EU‟s relation to future members 
(and associated states). The EU has developed through successive waves of so-called 
enlargements to less well-entrenched democracies in the South and the East. Given their frail 
nature this may be thought to have weakened the democratizing thrust over time, but there is a 
clear case for the opposite: the different rounds of enlargement have continued to give impetus to 
a justificatory process with democratizing effects. This stems from the fact that the EU is made 
up of democratic states exclusively, with democracy and rule of law as explicit entrance 
requirements and a system of close monitoring to ensure compliance.
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 This has isomorphic 
effects. The EU projects democratic norms institutionally entrenched in representative 
government beyond its own borders, and this very projection, feeds back on the EU itself: Would 
the EU itself qualify for EU-membership if it applied? The EU‟s external projection of this 
principle (unto applicants), on pain of performative self-contradiction,  induces the internal 
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application of the principle, at the EU and Member State level. This has generated a self-
reinforcing virtuous cycle. 
How strong this cycle is hinges on how well the distinct form of EU parliamentarisation is 
able to deal with a number of central democratic challenges. The EU system is as noted 
embedded in a European multilevel parliamentary field. In this structure deliberation is needed to 
spell out the conditions and terms of representation because it is not clear at the outset what is to 
be represented by whom. Hence it brings about what Saward has termed the Representative claim 
– „seeing representation in terms of claims to be representative by a variety of political actors‟ 
rather than as a fixed category emanating from elections
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. While „statists‟ (such as Rittberger 
and Hix) underline the mainstreaming of representation in the EU, transnationalist tend to discard 
it. Our position is that representation is a salient and important feature of the multilevel 
constellation that makes up the EU, but its organisational manifestation is contested. The EU‟s 
distinct representation-deliberation interface has also been under-theorised.  
 One challenge pertains to the determination of the representatives‟ respective mandates, 
which need to be sorted out in a system of overlapping competencies. Another complementary 
challenge pertains to the question of constituency. Who is the demos? The development of EU-
democracy is a complex process where the construction of the EU-level constituency takes place 
with an attendant re-construction of (national and regional) constituency.
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 How this is worked 
out has important implications for the nature of democratic autonomy and accountability. The 
forging of accounts is a deliberative process, and must be so notably in the EU due to the sheer 
number and range of actors in the field. The interweaving of levels and competences in the EU 
suggests that the three processes of spelling out mandates, constructing/reconstructing 
constituency, and clarifying autonomy and accountability relations will be dynamic. What is to 
be represented by whom must be established through debate because there is no template 
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available. The democratic merit of this process will hinge on the quality of the justifications it is 
able to bring to the table.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this article we set out to account for why the main pattern of EU democratization has unfolded 
not along the lines that the proponents of the EU as a system of transnational governance have 
propounded, but rather along the lines of an EU organized as a – distinct - system of 
representative parliamentary government. EU democratization has since its inception drawn on 
the parliamentary principle and representative democratic standards; this has facilitated the 
creation of shared meanings and transactions among the relevant organisations; it has formed the 
basis for actors‟ legitimacy and status; it has conveyed organizational guidance and working 
procedures; and it has served as a constant impetus for the strengthening of the EP. This 
arrangement stops short of full-fledged EU parliamentarisation as vestiges of the EU‟s pillar 
structure still remain; given the EP‟s limited role in these (II and III), the EP falls short. This does 
not change very markedly with the Lisbon Treaty which formally abolishes the pillar structure, 
but nevertheless contains a range of provisions that protect most of the vestiges of the second 
pillar, with deleterious democratic effects. 
We have sought to demonstrate that the EU‟s democratization is best understood from a 
deliberative democratic perspective, albeit through a new – institutional – variant, which 
understands justification as taking place through reference to the actors‟ agreed-upon standards. 
This variant is able to capture the distinct features of EU democratization, namely that it unfolds 
in a context of already existing representative-democracies, but takes on a distinct shape that is in 
need of further theoretical elaboration and justification. The actors have to a large extent shared 
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the same democratic principles and have also agreed on the merits of representative democracy 
but have disagreed over the idea of post-national democracy, and also over what representation at 
the European level entails. The disagreement has not prevented the forging of a multilevel system 
of tightly interwoven parliaments. But the structure that has been wrought nevertheless brings up 
a number of important challenges for the theory and practice of democracy. 
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